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The pricing structure appropriate for a firm which faces a peak
load problem,' as do most natural gas pipeline companies, has been
subjected to a thorough examination in the economic literature over
the past fifteen years.2 Unfortunately, that examination has been al-
most entirely theoretical, and has not been applied to the concrete
problems faced by the Federal Power Commission in its task of regu-
lating gas pipeline rates; and the FPC, in developing a body of law
which has, at best, a vague relation to a rational basis, has demon-
strated its need for the assistance of experts.3 However, the FPC does
not bear sole responsibility for this irrational development, since the
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fornia Bar. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Peter 0. Steiner of the
faculty of Economics of the University of Michigan and of the University of Michigan Law
School, for his comments on earlier drafts of this article. The author, of course, accepts all
responsibility for any errors.
1. A peak load problem exists when a product is demanded in more than one time period
and the quantity demanded during each period is different although the price remains constant.
Steiner, Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing, 71 Q.J. EcON. 585, 587 (1957).
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application of economic theory to pipeline rate regulation is compli-
cated, and a thoroughly satisfactory solution is not feasible under
existing statutory constraints. Nonetheless, because it is better to
approach perfection than to ignore it, a legal-economic analysis of
pipeline rate regulation is appropriate. While the resolution of all the
regulatory difficulties in this area might require statutory changes,
there are a significant number of interim steps which can be taken to
narrow the gap between economic theory and regulatory practice.
The solution to the problem of peak load pricing, that is, the
proper method for determining prices for peak and off-peak users,
was succinctly presented by Professor Steiner in 19571 and, before
that, by Boiteaux in France.' While the theory indicates a possible
solution to the major problems of gas pipeline rate regulation, the
FPC has ignored it. The limited discussion which follows is not in-
tended as a critical analysis of the Boiteaux-Steiner solution, but
merely as a demonstration of the theory's usefulness.
THE THEORY OF PEAK LOAD PRICING
There are four assumptions which simplify the Boiteaux-Steiner
analysis. First, it is assumed that the cost of obtaining a unit of
production capacity6 (hereinafter represented by "B" dollars) does
not vary with the number of units of capacity obtained, and that one
unit of capacity can be used to produce one unit of output in any or
all periods of operation. Second, it is assumed that production capac-
ity can be increased without incurring diseconomies by an amount so
small that the increased capacity is sufficient to produce only one
additional unit of output in each period of operation. Third, it is
assumed that the cost of using existing capacity to produce output
remains constant for each unit of output (hereinafter represented by
"b" dollars per unit of output). Finally, it is assumed that the same
price per unit must be charged to all purchasers of output making
purchases in the same time period. However, the price charged during
4. Steiner.
5. Boiteaux, La Tarification des demandes en pointe, 58 REVUE GENERALE DE
L'ELECTRIcIT 321 (1949). Boiteaux' work was not available in English until 1960, Peak Load
Pricing, 33 J. Bus. 157 (1960), and Steiner's independently arrived at solution is therefore
commonly considered the foundation of the solution.
6. It is important to observe that the cost of a unit of capacity cannot be equated with the
cost of a unit of output. Capacity measures not output, but rather the ability to produce output
in a given period of time.
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a particular time period may differ from the price charged during a
different time period. 7
Operating within these assumptions, which are useful but not es-
sential to the analysis, 8 Steiner and Boiteaux demonstrate a method
for determining the price of the commodity during different time
periods in such a manner that the resources devoted to the production
and sale of the commodity will be used optimally.
Initially, "price" in the context of the peak load problem does not
mean the price at which a unit of output is sold, but rather means the
total amount received from the sale of all units of output which are
produced by a given unit of capacity. Since a unit of capacity can
produce output during each time period, the total amount received in
all periods from output produced by any unit of capacity equals the
"price" for that unit of capacity.'




7. Although the assumptions upon which the theory is based are simplifications, relaxing
them does not impair the validity of the model. See Steiner, PROCEEDINGS. Rather, it merely
makes the analysis more complex and renders the graphical depiction much less satisfactory.
8. Id.
9. For example, assume that there are two relevant time periods, day and night. If the nth
unit of capacity is used to produce output which is sold for yI dollars during the day and for
Y2 dollars during the night, then the total output produced by the nth unit of capacity was sold
for a "price" of yI + Y2 dollars. The demands for output during different time periods are
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equal duration; 0 the demand curves for the output produced by units
of capacity during those three periods are represented by lines D1 , D2
and D3 . If the product is gas and the three periods are the three eight-
hour periods in a day, then any given point on the D1 curve represents
the amount of capacity which will be needed to produce the output
which gas users will demand, at the price which corresponds with that
point, during the first eight hours of the day and similarly, D2 and
D3 indicate the demand for capacity during the second and third
eight-hour periods. The base line of Figure I is b-the level of operat-
ing costs per unit of output--Iand 'D1, D2 and D3 , none of which
extends below b, represent the demand at prices in excess of operating
costs. It is assumed that if price is below operating costs during one
or more periods, then the capacity will not be operated d'uring that
period. The level represented by B is the cost per unit of obtaining new
capacity; because this cost is by assumption constant, the marginal
cost (MC) of new capacity equals its average cost (AC).
p





- 3  FIGURE 2
thus complementary, in the sense that they do not compete with each other for the same output;
rather, each determines how much will be paid for the output of one unit of capacity produced
at different times, and their total determines how much will be paid for all the output produced
by a unit of capacity throughout one cycle of the relevant periods of time.
10. It should not be thought that there must be any specific numbers of periods, such as




Because demand curves DI, D2 and D3 represent the demand for
capacity in each of three separate periods and are complementary, the
total demand for capacity is the vertical sum of the demand curves
for each period-the vertical sum for each level of total capacity
equals the amount that will be paid for the output produced by one
unit of capacity during a 24 hour day. Thus, in Figure 2, Dc repre-
sents the total demand for capacity-the vertical sum of D1. D2 and
D3.
Under the Boiteaux-Steiner approach, the appropriate prices to
charge are P1 during period one, P2 during period two, and P3 during
period three." The amount of capacity used during periods two and
three will be the same, X2 = X3, and each represents the full use of
capacity. Both the D2 users and D3 users are "peak" users in the
sense that they use capacity to the fullest extent, although D3 is clearly
"stronger" than D2. During period one, f1 units of capacity should
be used, for if output were at any greater level, the proceeds from its
sale would be less than the operating cost of producing it.
The most important characteristics of this model are that the
producing firm will have that amount of physical capacity which
corresponds to the optimal use of resources, the firm's capacity will
be efficiently utilized, and the full social cost of the resources used will
be covered by revenues. If the maximum capacity were less than x 2
and X3, people willing to pay the cost of producing additional output
would be unable to purchase the product. Since the excess of con-
sumer satisfaction over the cost of resources devoted to production,
represented by the area between the demand curve, Dc. and the aver-
age cost curve, AC, is to be maximized,' 2 it follows that if capacity is
less than X2 and 13, the potential social benefit of an additional unit
will be greater than the cost of providing it. At a capacity greater than
32 and X3, however, the revenues obtained from the use of the capacity
would not be sufficient to pay the cost of creating it. Thus, R2 and 3
1I. The welfare proposal which forms the basis of the Steiner-Boiteaux analysis is that it is
desirable to maximize the excess of expressed consumer satisfaction over the cost of resources
devoted to production. See Steiner 596. This requires that the output be that which would be
produced if price were equal to marginal cost. In the case of a profit-maximizing monopolist,
of course, price would be set in such a manner that the quantity produced and sold would be at
the level at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The difference in output between that
which is socially optimal and that which results from monopolistic profit maximization is what
is usually thought of as the resource misallocation evil of monopoly.
12. See note II supra.
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indicate the preferable output capacity-there is enough output that
all consumers willing to pay the cost of capacity are able to purchase
the product, but the amount of potential output, with full utilization
of capacity, does not result in a price so low as to result in a loss.
The optimal price schedule indicated by Figure 2 also leads to an
efficient utilization of capacity, for capacity is used, during all peri-
ods, to the maximum feasible extent. During period one, capacity is
used to the extent that buyers are willing to pay the cost of operating
the facilities. During the second and third periods, the total capacity
is in use. The prices P2 and P3 are, it should be noted, proportionate
to the strength of the demand curves from which they are derived. 13
Thus, the Boiteaux-Steiner solution to the problem of peak load pric-
ing is the correct solution in the sense that it leads, not only to the
construction of the most efficient amount of capacity, but also leads
to the most efficient use of that capacity.
Although the FPC, like most regulatory agencies, is not always
preoccupied with efficiency, the manner in which the economic litera-
ture has been ignored by those who deal closely with the FPC is
surprising. As a result, there are now two entirely separate bodies of
literature, one dealing with economic theory and the other with the
FPC regulation of gas pipeline rates. The interaction between the two,
although necessary, has thus far been nonexistent.
THE PEAK LOAD PROBLEM AND THE NATURAL GAS
PIPELINE INDUSTRY
Before an analysis of FPC regulation can be meaningful, it is
necessary to understand some aspects of the basic structure of the gas
pipeline industry. The industry differs significantly from the
Boiteaux-Steiner model in terms of the relevant cost curves. Typi-
cally, within the relevant range of pipeline sizes, the cost per unit of
pipeline capacity decreases as the total capacity increases-the typical
firm faces both a decreasing average cost function and a decreasing
marginal cost function. 4 Firms with a relatively large pipeline capac-
13. In economic terms, the fact that the price varies solely with respect to demand leads to
the conclusion that it is discriminatory. Steiner 590. But cf. Williamson, supra note 2. It is
probably not, however, within the prohibition of 15 U.S.C. § 717c(b) (1970), since it is neither
"undue" nor "unreasonable." Cf. Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 203 F.2d 895 (3d Cir.
1953); Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 173 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1949).
14. See P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoy, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 175 (1964). If average
cost is decreasing as output increases, it necessarily follows that marginal cost is less than
average cost, for if the cost of the average unit is decreasing, the cost of the "last" unit added
must be less than what was previously the average cost.
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ity are able to provide gas at a lower per unit cost than firms with a
relatively small pipeline capacity. 5 These cost conditions are graphi-
cally depicted in Figure 3, in which p represents price, x represents
quantity, the average cost function is indicated by AC, the marginal






Since the marginal and the average cost curves do not intersect the
demand curve at the same point, one must decide whether to set price
equal to marginal cost or equal to average cost." If the former is
chosen, each customer will pay the cost of providing his service, but
average costs will not be covered and it will be necessary to subsidize
the company. If the latter is selected, there will be people who are
willing to pay the actual cost of providing them with service but who
are unable to obtain service because they are unwilling to pay the
higher price which is charged. A third possibility, which avoids this
choice, allows the firm to obtain additional revenues from some con-
15. The conditions are therefore present which give rise to "natural monopoly." C. ALLEN,
J. BUCHANAN & M. COLBERG, PRICES, INCOME AND PUBLIC POLICY 339-41 (1954); W. HAYNES,
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 410-11 (1963); R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 357-58 (1968).
16. See generally, Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and
of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1942); Vickrey, Some Implications of
Marginal Cost Pricing for Utilities, 45 AM. ECON. Rav. 605 (1955).
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sumers in order to offset losses resulting from sales at marginal cost
prices to other purchasers. But to suggest that such an approach
provides a solution to the pricing problem is misleading, for it is, in
reality, nothing more than a disguised subsidy paid by one group of
customers rather than by the government. Such a policy may be
justified if there is sufficient reason for determining that the subsidiz-
ing group "should" perform that function, but it is not inherently
desirable. 7
The second major difference between the typical natural gas pipe-
line company and the company assumed to exist for purposes of the
Boiteaux-Steiner model is that demand during one period must be
represented by two curves instead of by one. Because the Natural Gas
Act limits the jurisdiction of the FPC to the "sale in interstate com-
merce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption,"' 8 it
is desirable for many purposes to differentiate between the demand
for "'jurisdictional" gas-sold for resale-and the demand for "non-
jurisdictional" gas-sold for direct consumption by the purchaser.
Typically, a very high percentage of gas purchases during peak peri-
ods will be jurisdictional, made by gas utility companies for distribu-
tion to their customers. Such companies usually contract with the
pipeline company for "firm" service-service which is guaranteed to
be available at all times.
Purchasers during periods of relatively weaker demand, however,
usually purchase "interruptible" service-their supply of gas will be
interrupted whenever the pipeline capacity must be devoted to the
service of firm purchasers-and the prices they pay are relatively low.
Interruptible service is commonly purchased by both jurisdictional
and non-jurisdictional users." For example, some utility companies,
17. None of these three approaches has been clearly adopted by the FPC. There is no
outright subsidy paid by the government to pipeline companies, and the probable goal of FPC
regulation has been to set prices equal to average cost. See text following note 61 infra. Since
the FPC approaches rate setting from a different conceputal framework, the question never
arises in these terms.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970). The Act also provides for jurisdiction over "the transpor-
tation of natural gas in interstate commerce . . . and . . . natural-gas companies engaged in
such transportation, or sale." Id. It has long been settled that the FPC has no power to regulate
the price of "direct" sales-that is, sales directly for consumption and not for resale. See, e.g.,
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961). The reason for this bifurca-
tion appears to be that competition in the non-jurisdictional market renders regulation unneces-
sary. See GARFIELD & LovEJoY 174.
19. See GARFIELD & LovEjoY 175-78. It is useful to observe at this point that interruptible
users pay only commodity charges (as discussed at text accompanying note 25 infra), while firm
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who purchase at FPC-determined rates, will purchase gas during off-
peak periods, at interruptible rates, and store it for distribution during
peak periods. On the other hand, some non-jurisdictional purchasers,
such as electrical utility companies and industrial plants, which are
equipped to use different types of fuel, will buy gas only during peri-
ods when it is available at the lower, interruptible prices. Since some
of such interruptible sales are jurisdictional, and subject to FPC
rates, while others are not, it is analytically useful to distinguish be-
tween the jurisdictional and the non-jurisdictional demand for the
output that results from the use of capacity during periods of rela-
tively weaker demand.
During any given off-peak period, the demand for non-
jurisdictional gas must compete for pipeline capacity with that for
jurisdictional gas. A unit of pipeline capacity can be used to supply
either a jurisdictional or a non-jurisdictional user, but not both. Thus,
the situation is inherently different from that discussed earlier in
which different time periods were being analyzed. There the demands
on capacity were noncompetitive, since one unit of capacity could be
used to supply one consumer during one period and another consumer
during another period.20 In that earlier discussion, it was observed
that the total demand for capacity could be represented by the vertical
sum of the demand curves applicable to each period, since the total
price realized from the use of capacity during all the periods was the
sum of the prices realized in each period. Here, however, the concern
is with different users during one time period. The total demand for
that period is the horizontal sum of the demand curves of each con-
sumer-for the total amount demanded during the off-peak period,
at any given price, is the sum of the demands of (not the sum of the
prices that would be paid by) jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional
users during that period at that price. It follows that the total demand
users pay both commodity charges and demand charges (id.). To the extent that commodity
charges approximate "b" dollars-which the definition of "commodity costs" suggests they
should approximate, but which in practice they do not-the pricing scheme for firm (peak) and
interruptible (off-peak) users would be appropriate, as Professor Steiner has observed in private
correspondence with the author. In that situation, firm users would pay, generally, B+b dollars
and interruptible users would pay b dollars. However, as is discussed infra, "commodity costs"
are not equal to b, but are equal to b plus some portion of B. If interruptible users, in fact,
used capacity to the fullest extent, and therefore were properly characterized as peik users (the
D2 users in Figure 2), such a pricing scheme might still be appropriate, but it is clear that any
such identity between the actual scheme and the ideal would be purely coincidental.
20. See text following note 8 supra.
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for capacity during both peak and off-peak periods is represented by
the horizontal sum of the jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional de-
mand during the off-peak periods, and the vertical sum of that hori-
zontal sum plus the peak demand for capacity. That three-part sum
is demonstrated in Figure 4, in which Dl represents the non-
jurisdictional demand for off-peak capacity, D2 the jurisdictional
demand for off-peak capacity, and Dc I the horizontal sum of D I plus
D2 . D3 represents the demand for peak capacity (which is, by as-
sumption, an entirely jurisdictional demand), and Dc2 the total de-





In Figure 5, Figure 4 has been superimposed on Figure 3, in order
to present, in rough approximation, the full model which is faced by
the FPC. Horizontal and vertical lines have been added in appropriate
places to indicate the pricing and output consequences of a decision
to impose either average cost pricing or marginal cost pricing on the
hypothetical firm which is represented by these functions. If average
cost pricing is used, the appropriate amount of capacity for the firm
to build and to operate during each period is X3A" During the period
of relatively weaker demand, IA units of capacity will be devoted to
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non-jurisdictional sales and R2A units will be devoted to the produc-
tion of output for jurisdictional sales. Since the solution in Figure 5
requires the full use of capacity during both time periods, the situation
depicted by Figure 5 is that of the "shifting peak" in which full
capacity is used during both periods, but the Boiteaux-Steiner analy-
sis demands different prices for each group. In Figure 5, the prices
charged the consumer classes for their use of capacity are represented
by PIA, P2A, and P3A 21 If marginal cost pricing is used, requiring that
a subsidy be paid to the pipeline company, the relevant points of
capacity construction and use, and the relevant prices, are indicated
by, respectively, x3M' XIM, x2M, Pl M' P2N and P3M"
Dc2





21. It is assumed here that P IA equals p 2A That assumption is made here for the same
reason that it was earlier assumed that prices to different users during one time period must be
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THE FPC RESPONSE TO THE PEAK LOAD PROBLEM:
ATLANTIC SEABOARD
The Atlantic Seaboard Formula
In Atlantic Seaboard Corp.22 the FPC announced the approach it
has followed, at least nominally, for some twenty years.23 The first
step in the Atlantic Seaboard approach requires allocating costs be-
tween jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional sales. This cost allocation
is fundamental to FPC rate setting, because the FPC adheres to the
view that its function is to prevent the acquisition of monopoly profits
on jurisdictional sales. Since that task is viewed as the raison d'etre
of regulation, the simplest method of regulating properly requires no
more than setting jurisdictional prices by reference to jurisdictional
operating costs plus an appropriate return on invested capital.2 1 Mo-
nopoly profits-an excessive return on invested capital-are necessar-
ily eliminated since the return is prevented from being excessive. To
accept such an approach requires, of course, a great deal of confidence
in the agency's ability accurately to measure and segregate jurisdic-
tional costs, for if the recovery allowed for those costs is excessive a
monopoly profit will be built into the rates set by the FPC. Appar-
ently, the FPC has that self-confidence, for it has maintained this
pattern of setting rates.
An essential element of the. Atlantic Seaboard approach is the
distinction between "commodity costs," which are the only charges
which interruptible users pay, and "demand costs," which firm users
pay in addition to commodity costs. In theory, the two types of costs
correspond to, respectively, operating costs and capacity costs, as
identical. In reality, however, it may be possible to charge different prices to different users
during one time period.
22. It F.P.C. 43, 94 P.U.R. (NS) 235 (1952), remanded on other grounds, 200 F.2d 108
(4th Cir. 1952).
23. It is perhaps not surprising that an erroneous analysis of the peak load problem was
endorsed in Atlantic Seaboard, for the Boiteaux solution, see note 3 supra, was then buried in
an obscure French journal, and Steiner's analysis was five years in the future. However, the
continued adherence to the Atlantic Seaboard formula is much more difficult to justify, for it
is now fifteen years since Steiner's solution appeared and more than ten years since the Boiteaux
analysis was translated.
24. GARFIELD & LovEjoy 180-84. The process of rate setting by reference to costs is not,
however, desirable. See text accompanying note 50 infra.
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those terms are used in the Boiteaux-Steiner model. 25 Unfortunately,
however, the distinction between the two types of costs was badly
blurred in Atlantic Seaboard and has not since been clarified by the
FPC. As a result, some confusion surrounds the conceptual distinc-
tion which appears throughout the FPC decisions.
The FPC, in examining a rate case, first separates variable costs
as generally attributable to commodity charges, and the propriety of
that attribution is not a matter of great dispute. Then, however, the
FPC calculates the total of "fixed" costs, including depreciation,
return on capital, and all other non-variable costs, and allocates those
fixed costs between commodity costs and demand costs on a fifty-fifty
basis. If it is assumed that the relevant demand curves are such that
there is at least one period of clear off-peak demand-that is, that
there is at least one group such as the D1 users in Figure 2-the
Atlantic Seaboard allocation of fixed costs leads to a charge to those
(interruptible) users which necessarily includes an element of capacity
costs even though their demand has no impact at all on the amount
of capacity constructed. In any event, it is apparent that the portion
of capacity costs which each jurisdictional user must pay under
Atlantic Seaboard bears no necessary relation to the portion which
the Boiteaux-Steiner approach would impose. If, for example, off-
peak users use 25 percent of the total amount of gas used during any
specific period, they will pay 25 percent of the total of all commodity
charges, and will also pay 25 percent of 50 percent (12.5 percent) of
the fixed costs since 50 percent of the fixed costs are allocated to the
commodity charge. Peak users, who use 75 percent of the gas and who
therefore pay 75 percent of the commodity costs, will pay 75 percent
of 50 percent (37.5 percent) of the fixed costs, in accordance with the
commodity charges which they pay; they will also pay the entire other
50 percent of the fixed costs allocated to the demand costs, which only
they pay. Thus the percentage of fixed costs paid by peak users is 87.5
percent. Nowhere in the calculation is the contribution of the separa-
ble demand curves to the cumulative demand curve considered.
Once costs are allocated between commodity costs and demand
costs, the FPC then seeks to allocate each of these costs between
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional sales. The reason for this alloca-
25. 11 F.P.C. 43, 52-53, 94 P.U.R. (NS) 235, 244 (1952). It has been suggested that even
the fundamental determination of which costs are fixed and which are variable was inappro-
priately made in Atlantic Seaboard. See, e.g., GARFIELD & LovEJoY 182-83.
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tion is simply that the FPC sets rates only for jurisdictional sales, and
these rates must not reflect any of the costs of supplying non-
jurisdictional users. First, commodity costs are allocated in the pro-
portion of jurisdictional to non-jurisdictional sales during the entire
test year.26 Demand costs are allocated between jurisdictional and
non-jurisdictional sales on the basis of the three-day peak demand for
gas during the test year.27 Thus, variable costs are allocated on the
basis of the costs incurred over a full year, while capacity costs are
allocated on the basis of use during a three-day peak period.
The FPC approach is thus based on finding an "accurate" alloca-
tion of costs between the different markets for gas. The Boiteaux-
Steiner approach is based on finding the price which will lead to
construction of the most efficient size pipeline and to the most effi-
cient utilization of that pipeline. While the Boiteaux-Steiner approach
uses costs in its analysis, it recognizes that the relationship between
costs and economically efficient prices is considerably more intricate
than does the FPC's approach.
Given this background, it is probably not surprising that the
Atlantic Seaboard formula has been sharply criticized and that the
FPC has retreated somewhat from the stance which it took in that
case. Unfortunately, however, the FPC retreat has not been an organ-
ized one, and no clear doctrine has yet been accepted by the FPC to
replace Atlantic Seaboard.
Modifications in the Seaboard Doctrine
The FPC's first opportunity to modify Atlantic Seaboard came
in the same year that it was decided, 1952. In Northern Natural Gas
Co. 8 the argument was made that demand costs should be allocated
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional sales on a basis other
than the three days of greatest sustained demand. The basis for the
argument was that "true" demand for capacity would be better mea-
sured by the three coldest days of the year. Inasmuch as the suggested
modification would have led to a greater allocation of costs to juris-
dictional sales, it would have meant that regulated prices would have
been increased to absorb the "additional" costs. However the FPC
26. GARFIELD & LovEjoY 183.
27. Id. at 184.
28. 11 F.P.C. 174, 95 P.U.R. (NS) 289 (1952), affdsub nom. State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC,
206 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 922 (1954).
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adopted the view, which was probably sound, that the modification
was suggested for no reason other than to justify a rate increase, and
refused to accept the suggestion. 29 Some sixteen years later this issue
arose again, and the FPC indicated that in appropriate cases a
"weather normalization adjustment" would be allowed.30 While some
commentators have criticized the selection of the three-day peak sus-
tained demand, 31 the availability of some adjustment is probably de-
sirable if the Atlantic Seaboard formula is to be maintained, and the
FPC has indicated that an adjustment will be allowed only under the
most extreme circumstances. 32 However, while the selection of the
three days may have important practical consequences for a particu-
lar pipeline company, it is far from being the most unsatisfactory
aspect of the Atlantic Seaboard formula.
The most disturbing aspect of Atlantic Seaboard is, rather, the
arbitrary fifty-fifty allocation of system-wide fixed costs between the
demand charge and the commodity charge. That allocation has no
justification other than the vague notion that "all gas transported by
the pipeline will share in all of the various kinds of expenses incurred
to transport the gas."13 3 There is no reason to suspect a connection
between the amount of the expenses that "should" be borne by a class
of consumers and the amount that is allocated to them by the fifty
percent approach. Indeed, it is clear from the Boiteaux-Steiner analy-
sis that under some circumstances a class of consumers should clearly
not be required to pay any portion of capacity costs. For example,
under the conditions represented by Figure 2, requiring the D1 users
to pay a portion of capacity costs would result in the situation in
which gas would not be sold to some consumers willing to pay the
full costs of providing it. It is meaningless to comment that they
should "pay their share" of the capacity costs, for it is clear that DI
consumers demand the gas because the pipeline exists; the pipeline
does not exist because they demand the gas. The situation is quite the
opposite with respect to D2 and D3 consumers. In the terms of the
graphical analysis, the very nature of the cumulative demand curve
29. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
30. Knoxville Util. Bd. v. Eastern Tenn. Natural Gas Co., 35 F.P.C. 534, 63 P.U.R.3d 359
(1966). The FPC indicated, however, that the adjustment would not easily be allowed, and
actually refused to allow it in the Knoxville case itself. Id. at 538, 63 P.U.R.3d at 364.
31. GARFIELD & LovEjoY 184.
32. See note 30 supra.
33. In re Atlantic Seaboard, 11 F.P.C. 43, 56, 94 P.U.R. (NS) 235, 247 (1952).
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makes it apparent that the D1 consumers simply do not have enough
demand to justify constructing a plant with capacity of R2 = R3. The
plant of this size was constructed because the intersection of Dc with
the MC curve occurred at that point on the graph. The D 1 curve had
ceased to have any effect upon the Dc curve long before that point of
intersection.
In fairness to the FPC, it must be pointed out that the agency,
responding to some of the criticisms of Atlantic Seaboard,34 has now
indicated severe dissatisfaction with the formula,3" and has begun to
move away from it. One of the ways in which the Commission has
sought to shift from a strict application of Atlantic Seaboard is found
in American Louisiana Pipe Line Co.36 In that case, the FPC paid lip
service to Atlantic Seaboard by carefully allocating fixed costs be-
tween the demand and the commodity charges, and even went to the
absurd length of so allocating the costs of storage facilities used exclu-
sively to help satisfy peak demand. 37 However, after going through
that allocation, the FPC mitigated its effect by allowing a "deviation
toward demand" of thirteen percent in the rate schedule. Thus, the
total demand charge was thirteen percent greater than the costs allo-
cated to that function, and the commodity charge was proportion-
ately less. As a result of this alteration in the price schedule, peak
prices would be greater, and off-peak prices less, than they would have
been under a strict application of Atlantic Seaboard. The reason given
34. GARFIELD & LovEJoY 184-85; Herz, Impact of Cost Allocation on Gas Pricing, 58 Pun,
UTIL. FORT. 685 (1965); Wellisz, The Public Interest in Gas Industry Rate Stnctures, Parts I
& II, 70 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 65, 145 (1962).
35. See, e.g, Knoxville Util. Bd. v. Eastern Tenn. Natural Gas Co., 35 F.P.C. 534, 539, 63
P.U.R.3d 359, 365 (1966); In re Great Lakes Gas Transp. Co., - F.P.C. _ 69 P.U.R.3d
497, 515 (1967), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Northern Natural Gas Transmission Co.
v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968); In re Midwestern Gas Transp. Co., 34 F.P.C. 973, 981-
82, 61 P.U.R.3d 241, 251-52 (1965), affd sub nom. Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. FPC, 374
F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1967); 1n re United Fuel Gas Co., 31 F.P.C. 1342, 1347, 55 P.U.R.3d 196,
202 (1964); In re American La. Pipe Line Co., 29 F.P.C. 932, 940,48 P.U.R.3d 321, 330 (1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 344 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
36. 29 F.P.C. 932, 941, 48 P.U.R.3d 321 (1963), rev'don other grounds, 344 F.2d 525 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
37. 29 F.P.C. 932,941,48 P.U.R.3d 321,331 (1963). Inasmuch as storage facilities are built
for "peak-shaving" purposes-Le., in order to reduce the demand for pipeline space during
peak periods-and compete with other users for gas during off-peak periods, it seems rather
remarkable that the off-peak users should be expected to contribute to the cost of constructing
storage facilities. Incredibly enough, the FPC was not unaware of these considerations, but
explicitly considered them and still arrived at a decision to allocate the cost of storage facilities.
38. 29 F.P.C. 932, 943-44,48 P.U.R.3d 321, 334-35 (1963).
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for the deviation was the necessity of lowering prices to industrial
users so that gas could compete effectively with other fuels in the
industrial market.
To the extent that the approach taken in American Louisiana and
similar cases39 represents a subsidization of off-peak users by peak
users because off-peak users would otherwise not buy gas, then the
action taken is entirely appropriate. Indeed, it should not be termed
a subsidy, for the price reduction benefits both off-peak users, who
pay less, and peak users, who would otherwise bear the full cost of
capacity construction. In the terminology of the FPC, the action is
appropriate because even though each dollar of commodity charge
paid contributes less to fixed costs than it would if the Atlantic
Seaboard formula were applied, the percentage of total pipeline reve-
nues consisting of commodity charges is greater than it would other-
wise be. The element of fixed costs in the commodity charge is
smaller, but the total revenue from commodity charges is greater. The
propriety of the American Louisiana approach, assuming it repre-
sents a reduction in off-peak prices from the level at which they would
be set in the absence of competition, can perhaps best be seen by an
example. Assume that firm users will purchase 150 thousand cubic
feet (MC F) of gas, that quantity will not change with changes in price
within the range relevant to this example, and that interruptible users
will purchase 50 MCF if the interruptible rate reflects an allocation
of 50 percent of fixed costs, but will purchase 100 MC F if that alloca-
tion is reduced to 40 percent. Under these circumstances, firm users
will pay 100 percent of the total demand charges and 75 percent of
the total commodity charges if 50 percent of fixed costs are so allo-
cated to commodity charges. If, however, only 40 percent of fixed
costs are so allocated, so that interruptible users purchase 100 MCF,
firm users will pay 100 percent of total demand charges and only 60
percent of total commodity charges.40 If the decrease in commodity
charges paid by firm users as a result of using a 60-40 percent alloca-
tion is greater than the increase in the demand charge resulting from
the allocation of more fixed costs to that charge, then both firm and
39. See, e.g., In re Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 34 F.P.C. 973, 61 P.U.R.3d 241'
(1965), affd sub nom. Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. FPC, 374 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1967).
40. If interruptible users purchase 50 MCF, the total amount of gas sold will be 200 MCF.
Interruptible users will pay 50/200, or 25%, of the total commodity charges. If, however, such
users purchase 100 MCF, the total amount of gas sold will be 250 MCF and the portion of
commodity charges paid by interruptible users will be 100/250 or 40%.
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interruptible users will benefit from using a 60-40 percent allocation
method.4"
Even though the FPC approach in A merican Louisiana may bene-
fit all gas consumers, there is no basis for saying that the FPC is
taking account of the existing demand curve of industrial users for
natural gas. It can only be said that the American Louisiana ap-
proach may lead to a price structure that is closer to that which is
economically ideal than would the Atlantic Seaboard formula strictly
applied. A moment's reflection will reveal, however, that the
American Louisiana approach may also indicate that in the absence
of competition for gas the FPC is following a policy, not necessarily
intentional, of actually requiring that monopoly profits be extracted
from industrial users to be used to offset inappropriately low prices
for gas destined for household use.12 Most of the commentators have
implicitly assumed this to be true4 3 and if this is in fact the case, it is
hard to justify on grounds other than political expediency." However,
no studies have been made which would lead to a conclusion as to the
actual role-conscious or otherwise-which has been played by the
FPC.
The American Louisiana method of approving a "deviation to
demand" is not the only way in which the FPC has been willing to
circumvent the doctrine of Atlantic Seaboard. In other cases the FPC
has permitted other deviations from the Seaboard formula, includ-
ing an allocation of costs on a two-thirds/one-third basis.4 In light
41. Assuming that industrial sales were made at a price greater than the variable costs
associated with those sales (and ignoring the relative scarcity of gas), it is demonstrable that
all users benefit from a price structure that enables gas to compete with other fuels for industrial
users. Inherent in this analysis are two assumptions. First, it is assumed that there will be a net
increase in revenues from industrial sales as a result of the decrease in price. In other words, it
is assumed that the price elasticity of demand for industrial gas is greater than unity in the
relevant price range. To the extent that industrial users are able to use other fuels if gas is too
expensive, and do rapidly switch to other fuels, that assumption is probably justified in many
instances. Second, it is assumed that when industrial prices are lowered, there is either no effect
in other gas markets, or any effects which may occur (such as an increase in the price to firm
users) are not of such a magnitude as to offset the increase in revenues from industrial sales.
42. See note 49 infra.
43. The assumption can be seen in the widely held view that interruptible rates are kept
unduly high by the application of the Atlantic Seaboard formula. See, e.g., GARFIELD &
LovEJoY 184-85; Herz, supra note 34; Wellisz, supra note 34.
44. See text following note 49 infra.
45. See, e.g., Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 34 F.P.C. 973,61 P.U.R.3d 241 (1965).
46. In re Great Lakes Gas Transp. Co., - F.P.C. - 69 P.U.R.3d 497, 515 (1967),




of these cases and of the FPC's expressed dissatisfaction with the
Atlantic Seaboard formula4" it is probably safe to say that Atlantic
Seaboard is no longer good law. So far, however, nothing has re-
placed it other than the judgment of the FPC-a judgment which is
apparently formed with very little regard for considerations other
than cost and, only when absolutely necessary, competition. Without
estimates of demand conditions, an appropriate determination of
prices is highly unlikely. The commissioners' judgment is probably
preferable to the Atlantic Seaboard formula, but only because the
former is more flexible than the latter. Until steps are taken to ensure
that the commissioners' judgment is based upon an appropriate eco-
nomic analysis of prevailing conditions, there is little likelihood that
they will be able to set prices at the economically appropriate levels.48
INCENTIVES PROVIDED BY THE FPC FOR PIPELINE COMPANIES
Even assuming the Atlantic Seaboard formula no longer has life
in it, it has not yet received a formal burial and the FPC still professes
to follow it. Furthermore, even if its precise formula has been rejected,
there is no indication that the cost-orientation which originally led to
its adoption has been abandoned. It is therefore appropriate, in ana-
lyzing the effect of FPC regulation upon the incentives of regulated
companies, to look to Atlantic Seaboard as representative of the FPC
approach. Such an analysis is essential to an understanding and an
appraisal of the FPC's work, for the greatest single danger of current
FPC regulation probably lies in the incentives for abuse that it pro-
vides the pipeline companies.
One of the most important aspects of a rate proceeding today is
the allocation of costs between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional
sales. Because this allocation will have a direct effect on the price of
jurisdictional gas, but will have no necessary effect on non-
jurisdictional prices, there is a clear incentive for pipeline companies
to exert efforts to affect the allocation. To the extent that a pipeline
can shift costs to jurisdictional users, and thus justify an increase in
their rates, it can nullify the ability of the agency to accurately set a
price lower than that which would be charged to a profit-maximizing
47. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.




monopolist. 9 For example, if the cost-based price of jurisdictional gas
is below a company's profit maximization price, the company may
be able to shift its price toward the profit maximization price by
persuading the FPC to allocate more costs to jurisdictional sales.
Since non-jurisdictional sales are not regulated, and therefore will not
be cost-determined, the allocation of more costs to jurisdictional sales
will have no effect upon the price that can be charged on non-
jurisdictional sales. Thus, by securing a heavier allocation of costs to
jurisdictional users, the pipeline can obtain higher rates on their gas
with no offsetting decrease in rates to non-jurisdictional users.
Furthermore, a pipeline may have an incentive to have a large
percentage of costs allocated to the demand charge. rather than to the
commodity charge. The commodity charge is paid by both firm-peak
and interruptible-off-peak users. The demand charge, on the other
hand, is paid by peak users only. Since peak gas is primarily used for
49. The unregulated, profit-maximizing monopolist who is fortunate enough to control a
market with the characteristics depicted in Figure 5 will use capacity to the point at which
marginal revenue, not shown in Figure 5, equals marginal cost. He will then determine price
and capacity use for each customer in a manner closely analogous to the manner shown in
Figures 2 and 5. It is possible, however, that there will be a monopoly as to some sub-markets
(such as, for example, the peak use market), but that the other sub-markets (such as the off-
peak markets) will be competitive. In that event, it may be expected that the company will, if
allowed, act like a monopolist in the markets, or during the periods of time, in which it faces
non-competitive conditions. One of the consequences of such a Jekyll-and-Hyde pattern of
behavior is that the pipeline company will have put itself in a position such that it can subsidize
the competitive market at the expense of the other. Thus, it may be possible for a regulating
agency to force a "hidden" subsidy upon a pipeline company by the simple expedient of keeping
prices low during the competitive period.
Because regulation may so easily lead to subsidy, particularly when the regulatory jurisdic-
tion does not extend to all users, it is both useful and important to attempt to identify the types
of consumers who use gas during different time periods. For the most part, off-peak users are
industrial users, while gas which is transported during peak hours is destined for households.
See GARFIELD & LovEjoY 175-77. Thus, a price structure which subsidizes off-peak users at the
expense of peak users will benefit industrial users and will operate as a tax on private individu-
als. It does not necessarily follow, of course, that a structure should be designed which will
subsidize peak users, for there is no apparent reason for individuals who use gas rather than
electricity to be given a reward for using gas. Even if off-peak gas users are a group that society
desires to tax, and even if peak users are a group that society desires to benefit, there is no
necessary reason for using the price structure of gas as a means for transferring funds from one
group to the other. Making the price structure serve this additional function renders it far less
useful for serving the one function for which it is ideally suited: allocating the most efficient
amount of the resource to each of its uses through the relationship of its price to the price of
competitive resources. Moreover, loading the subsidy program onto the price structure interferes
with the freedom of choice of both the taxed consumer and the subsidized consumer. To the




household needs, it will probably be true, in the short run at least, that
an increase in rates will not affect the amount of consumption since
households have a demand for fuel which is probably not responsive
to price changes, and unlike industrial users, cannot easily change the
fuel used. Whether an increase in peak prices at the cost of a decrease
in off-peak prices would be profitable in a given case would depend
upon the comparative price elasticities of demand for peak and for
off-peak users in that case. Moreover, it may be true that a "proper"
pricing structure would lead to higher peak prices, and the incentives
may therefore have socially desirable consequences. However, it is
important to recognize that there will be an incentive to affect the
allocation of costs between the demand and the capacity charges; even
if regulated prices are too low for peak users, it is not generally
sensible to create a regulatory agency and to allow the circumvention
of the regulated rates."
Most of the commentators who have analyzed the Atlantic
Seaboard formula assume that the formula results in overcharging
interruptible users and undercharging firm users.-" However, this as-
sumption has not been established by empirical evidence, and what
little evidence does exist could be interpreted to suggest that interrup-
tible rates are too low. 52 First, it appears that in many instances the
price of interruptible gas is considerably less, per million BTU, than
50. The mere fact that there may be incentives to affect improperly the cost allocations does
not mean that pipeline companies will always attempt to do so.
51. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 34; Nissel, The Impact of Cost Allocations Upon Future of
the Natural Gas Industry, 66 PuB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY 512 (1960); Ross, How Practical is the
Seaboard Formula?, 71 PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY 26 (1963); Wellisz, supra note 34.
52. If the effect of the Atlantic Seaboard formula is that demand charges are set too high,
so that firm rates are too high and interruptible rates are too low, then it follows that peak
sales will be less than they would otherwise be. Thus, the tendency will be toward the extraction
of a monopoly profit from peak users. However, the existence of those monopoly profits may
be very hard to discover. First, it may be hidden because the excess capacity that should result
from a reduction in supply to firm users may take the form of a decrease in stored gas. Although
excess capacity in a pipeline itself may be observed, it is much harder to determine whether the
"right" amount of gas is being put into storage during those periods. A second reason that it
may be hard to discover whether monopoly profits are being extracted from firm users is that
the pipeline company has an unregulated off-peak market in which it might have monopoly
power. Accordingly, the existence of monopoly profits does not itself demonstrate that prices
have been set too high in one of the jurisdictional areas. Third, it is not at all easy to determine,
in fact, whether monopoly profits are ever being derived. There are simply too many ways in
which a monopoly may be enjoyed, such as poor cost control, or excessive leisure on the part
of highly paid executives, for the existence of a monopoly to be easily observed.
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the cost of alternative fuels,5 3 even though there are reasons to suggest
that gas should be a preferable fuel. If for no other reason than the
harhiful effect on the environment of burning oil and coal, and the
much less harmful effect of burning gas,54 one would expect that gas
would be fully competitive with coal and oil, even at slightly higher
prices.55 Another indication that interruptible rates are too low is the
recent and rapid expansion of storage facilities built by pipeline com-
panies. 6 This expansion may suggest that interruptible rates are too
low in comparison to firm rates, so that it has become more profitable
to store gas during off-peak periods for sale during peak periods than
to sell the gas during off-peak periods. But this is not the only conclu-
53. NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION, STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS 10, 12 (1969). In
some instances the comparative figures are quite surprising. In Rockford, Illinois, for example,
Commonwealth Edison is reported to be able to obtain gas for approximately one-third less
cost per million BTU than it can obtain coal. Id.
54. The environmental advantages of gas as a fuel were brought to public attention in the
Spring of 1970 when a group known as the Committee Against Pollution invaded the annual
stockholders' meeting of Commonwealth Edison in Chicago and demanded that the utility
increase its efforts to halt the pollution of that city's air, much of which is apparently caused
by burning relatively high sulphur content coal. See N.Y. Times, April 28, 1970, at 61, col. I.
Even those who would argue against using gas instead of coal for the purpose of producing
electricity-and there are a number of sound arguments which lead to the conclusion that gas
should not replace coal in that use-concede the environmental advantages of gas. See, e.g.,
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
55. This measure is not, taken alone, a reliable basis for conclusions concerning the sound-
ness of present interruptible rates. The figures derived from STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS
are generally for non-jurisdictional sales since the gas sales included are those made for the
production of electricity and therefore not for resale under the holding of FPC v. Transconti-
nental Pipe Line Co., 365 U.S. 1 (1961). Since non-jurisdictional rates may be expected to differ
from jurisdictional rates, these figures may be of limited significance. On the other hand, the
design of the FPC's jurisdiction is based on the view that competition will limit the price charged
to industrial consumers, see text accompanying note 12 supra; and the FPC is supposed to set
the price of jurisdictional sales at the competitive level. In theory, then, the two rate schedules
should be the same, at least in the long run. To the extent that the FPC fulfills its assigned
function, the STEAM-ELECTRIC PLANT FACTORS figures are significant for the present analysis.
56. Interestingly enough, Garfield and Lovejoy suggest that the Atlantic Seaboard formula
makes interruptible rates too high, GARFIELD & LovEJoY 184, and also document the rapid
increase in the use of storage facilities in recent years. Id. at 177-78. They do not attempt to
rationalize the apparent contradiction between the evidence and their conclusion. It is possible
that their conclusion is appropriate, for there may be explanations for an increased use of
storage other than a price for interruptible gas which is too low relative to the price of firm
gas, but it is surprising that they do not even attempt to come to grips with what initially appears
to be a contradiction. Possible explanations for an increase in storage facilities are that there
are exceedingly great prospects for growth in the peak market, or that the competition of other
fuels in the off-peak market is so great that it is advantageous to store gas for peak sales rather




sion which may be derived from the fact of rapid expansion of storage
facilities. It is equally plausible that the price of interruptible gas is
higher than it should be in relation to other fuels, 57 so that other fuels
control the market, and it is more advantageous for pipeline compa-
nies to transport and store gas than to leave the pipeline space idle.
It may even be true that there is no possible cost justification for
selling interruptible gas."s The reason for the decision to store gas can
be determined in a particular case, but cannot be abstractly deter-
mined for all cases; accordingly, conclusions cannot be drawn from
the mere fact that a considerable amount of gas is being stored.
A different criticism which has been suggested with respect to the
Atlantic Seaboard formula is that it may create an incentive for
pipeline companies unnecessarily to expand their facilities since the
formula expresses the permitted net income as a percentage of a
pipeline's capital investment.5 9 Since investment is the source of in-
come, it is possible that companies may attempt to allocate fixed costs
to the commodity charge in order to increase interruptible rates and
reduce firm rates, thereby encouraging peak use and creating an ap-
parent need for even further expansion.6"
A final objection to the Atlantic Seaboard approach is the effect
of that formula upon high- and low-load factor users. The load factor
57. If demand charges are too low, so that interruptible rates are too high and firm rates
are too low, the inappropriate determination may be more easily discovered. Such a situation
would result in excessive capacity being used during peak hours, and in the existence of substan-
tial unused capacity during off-peak hours. It is likely that excessive quantities of gas would
be stored for sale during peak periods. However, these characteristics would not indicate conclu-
sively that firm prices are set too low. The situation may rather be that the off-peak demand
for gas is simply not strong enough to justify devoting full capacity to its satisfaction. In terms
of the Boiteaux-Steiner model discussed earlier in this article, the demand for interruptible gas
may be represented by D t in Figure 2. In such a case, it would be entirely appropriate to use
pipeline capacity to the ultimate extent at all times and to store some gas during off-peak
periods for sale during peak periods.
58. That would be true if it were the case that prices which were low enough to be competi-
tive in the interruptible market would be too low in comparison to firm rates to make the sale
of interruptible gas profitable. The situation then would be one in which there were two markets
in which the company may sell-the present interruptible market and the future firm market.
59. Wellisz, supra note 34, at 150.
60. A somewhat different effect of tying income to investment is suggested in Averch &
Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AMt. ECON. Rav. 1052 (1962).
The Averch-Johnson theory is based on the conclusion that allowing a return only on capital
will lead to inappropriate substitutions of capital for labor. That problem may be pertinent to
FPC decisions, and it might be reduced if a Boiteaux-Steiner approach were adopted. It is not,
however, a difficulty which needs further attention here.
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of a pipeline is the percentage of reserved space in a pipeline that is
actually used for the transportation of gas to the consumer who has
reserved the space. Thus, it is pertinent only with firm users, since
only they have reserved space. Such users pay a demand charge, based
upon the space which they have reserved, and a commodity charge,
based on the actual amount of gas transported to them. In this situa-
tion the allocation of any fixed costs to the commodity charge creates
a form of price discrimination to the detriment of high-load-factor
users.61 Under the Atlantic Seaboard formula, a high-load-factor user
will pay a greater percentage of fixed costs than a low-load-factor user
because he pays a greater commodity charge, even though the low-
load-factor use? has the same right to obtain gas and therefore pre-
empts as much of the pipeline capacity.
This aspect of the formula brings out clearly the fundamental
unsoundness of the FPC approach, that is, the notion that prices must
be derived from an analysis of costs. Since it is true that the consumer
who has the right to obtain gas during peak hours, but who uses none,
pays only a demand charge, while the interruptible user pays only a
commodity charge, it is impossible to arrive at an appropriate price
structure if prices are to depend upon where costs are allocated.62 In
order to charge the low-load-factor customer an appropriate amount
for the capacity he preempts, it is necessary to include in the commod-
ity charge no more than the actual variable costs associated with gas
transmission.63 HQwever, if interruptible users are to pay more than
merely the variable costs of gas transmission, as they should whenever
their demand leads to full utilization of capacity-such as the D2
users in Figure 2-then the commodity charge should include some
amount of fixed costs. In that event, however, the off-peak interrupti-
61. Nissel, supra note 51, at 516-17.
62. It will be possible to arrive at such a price structure only if there is but one period during
which full capacity is used, so that, as determined under the Boiteaux-Steiner approach, there
is no group of users which uses full capacity but pays less than the highest price; in terms of
Figure 2, there is no "D2' group. It is likely, however, that such conditions will not often
prevail.
63. It has been observed that a high-load-factor user should pay more than a low-load-factor
user per unit of capacity because the "high-load-factor user makes greater average use of a unit
of capacity." GARFIELD & LovEJoY 185 n.55. Presumably, the reason for that principle is that
there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the measurement of variable costs and a consequent
fear that the fixed cost will, as measured, include some charges such as actual wear and tear
that are in fact variable. Considerations such as these, which apparently lead Garfield and
Lovejoy to accept an approach that might be termed "pragmatic but second best" are ignored
here both in order to simplify the analysis and because such an approach is only second best.
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ble users-the D 1 user in Figure 2-will be charged too much and will
purchase less. Clearly these requirements are incompatible and are
indicative of the need to abandon the practice of basing prices on costs
and to begin, at last, to adopt the Boiteaux-Steiner approach in FPC
rate proceedings.
CONCLUSIONS: THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO GAS PIPELINE
REGULATION
The approach to peak load pricing established by Boiteaux and
Steiner, in the abstract, leads to a logical determination of the appro-
priate size of pipeline construction and the appropriate prices which
should be charged for pipeline products. If there are two periods at
which the full capacity of a pipeline is used, the Boiteaux-Steiner
solution compels the conclusion that the price to customers during
each of those periods should not be the same if the relative contribu-
tion to the cumulative demand curve of each of the two separate
demand curves is not identical. Rather, the users with the "stronger"
demand curve should pay a higher price for the gas sold to them; the
price should be higher because it should contain a greater amount of
the contribution toward capacity costs. Users whose demand is less
strong, but who also require the full use of capacity, should make a
lesser contribution to capacity costs. If there is a truly off-peak class
of users-as in the D I users in Figure 2-which does not use the full
capacity of the pipeline, that group-or, more precisely, the group
using the pipeline during that off-peak period-should pay only the
variable costs directly associated with providing them service. The
prices established in this manner are not necessarily related either to
those which would be established by the profit maximizing monopo-
lists or to those which would be established by the FPC under present
regulatory procedures. It is conceivable that present procedures lead
to the establishment of prices which are lower both than the ideal price
and than the price of the profit maximizing monopolists, and it is
therefore conceivable that attempts.by pipeline companies to influence
FPC prices will, in effect, be an attempt to move them towards the
ideal level. However, there is no apparent evidence indicating the
actual relationship among the three sets of prices, or of the effect of
such industry efforts.
It is clear that the framework within which the FPC must operate
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is not as clear or as easily examined as that of the Boiteaux-Steiner
model. First, the problem of long-term decreasing marginal and aver-
age cost functions compels a solution which differs to some extent
from the Boiteaux-Steiner solution unless marginal cost pricing is
employed and pipeline companies are externally subsidized. That
problem has been examined in depth in the economic literature and
need not be re-examined here. The second major distinction between
the FPC framework and the Boiteaux-Steiner model is the existence
of a non-jurisdictional demand for gas for which prices cannot be
regulated. Because that demand exists, the price which is set by the
FPC will not necessarily be the price to all consumers during any
given time period. Moreover, the Boiteaux-Steiner determined price,
which maximizes the excess of expressed consumer satisfaction over
the cost of resources devoted to production may not be the price which
will be charged in the unregulated market, since that other market
may not be fully competitive and the monopolist will desire to maxim-
ize monopoly profits.
Thus, the regulation of prices by the FPC in the manner which is
ideal is not an easy chore. Nonetheless, FPC regulation has heretofore
ignored that chore entirely, and there can no longer be any question
but that a re-evaluation of its rate-setting procedures is called for. The
view that rates should be determined by costs is not inherently unrea-
sonable for an agency that views its function as insuring that monop-
oly profits are not derived by a regulated company. But such an
approach can and does lead to wrong and inconsistent results." The
FPC should instead refer to the costs of a company only to ensure
that its rates are not, in fact, allowing monopoly profits. The argu-
ment that such an approach will be ineffective because discovery will
be made only after the profit has been extracted may be valid under
the present law, based on statutory language that a final rate determi-
nation cannot be retroactively reappraised if it subsequently appears
that the rate determination was too high." Accordingly, either an
amendment to the Act or an unduly broad reading of its fairly restric-
64. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
65. This is the clear implication of FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9 (1968). But see
FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co.; 371 U.S. 145 (1962). In Sunray, the Court held that
under 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970), refunds could not be ordered below a rate set in a final,
unconditional permanent certificate. Tennessee Gas involved the easily distinguishable situation
of a rate increase initiated pending a determination of reasonableness.
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tive language is called for. The statute should not demand that the
FPC have such confidence in its decisions that it be willing to make
them irrevocable, for such an approach only encourages too much
initial attention to costs. Even so, until such time as the present law
is changed, either legislatively or judicially, it would be desirable for
the FPC to be willing to take miore of a risk.
The appropriate approach to the pricing problem would be that
which is suggested by the Boiteaux-Steiner model. Prices should be
set in such a manner as to ensure that there is neither excess capacity
nor excess demand during any period. The sole exception to that
structure should be the situation in which there will be excess capacity
unless prices for one group of consumers are set below the variable
cost of providing the gas. In that situation, those customers should
be charged only the variable costs. During periods in which firm
customers are being served, a two-price system should be used to
avoid inappropriate discrimination between high- and low-load-factor
consumers. This aspect of the needed changes is particularly impor-
tant, since it is desirable to encourage high-load-factor use, and the
present structure does exactly the opposite.6"
It is clear that a price structure such as that suggested requires that
the FPC shift much of its attention away from costs. Such a shift is
indeed desirable, for the essence of efficient peak-load pricing is atten-
tion to demand. Estimates of the demand curves of various users are
vital. Such estimates are, of course, speculative, but not so speculative
as to produce inherently less accurate results than the current cost-
allocation approach.
The relationship between costs and revenues need not and should
not be ignored. If profits appear excessive under a price structure
which seems to eliminate both excess capacity and excess demand,
then there is a clear indication that the existing facilities need to be
expanded, either through making storage facilities functional or
through expanding the pipeline facilities themselves. The appropriate
amount of expansion also depends upon economic analysis. In its
application to the matter of expansion, however, the Boiteaux-Steiner
approach becomes somewhat more speculative and less easily applied.
However, it is preferable to alternative means of determining the
proper extent of expansion.
66. See GARFIELD & LoVEJoY 185.
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A number of the suggested changes can be accomplished with
relative ease. Their effectiveness, however, would be considerably aug-
mented if Congress were to expand the jurisdiction of the FPC to
include all sales by natural gas pipelines. 7 The presence of non-
jurisdictional sales clouds the analysis of FPC regulation in too many
places to be justified by the fact that competition may exist in the
direct sale market. While there might be some difficulties in that
market if gas were regulated and other fuels were not, competition
between regulated and unregulated fuels is justified by the need to
make FPC regulatory activities more easily analyzed and corrected.
These changes require little in the way of actual alteration in FPC
operations.68 They require that the FPC shift its attention from the
approach exemplified by Atlantic Seaboard, but there are indications
that the FPC is already dissatisfied with that approach.69 They require
that the FPC jurisdiction be expanded, which the FPC may not de-
sire,70 but that is not a matter which is entirely within the power of
the FPC.
67. There may, of course, be solme limitations imposed by the commerce clause of the
Constitution on the power of Congress to regulate gas rates within a state. However, that
constitutional limitation has not hampered Congressional legislation in any significant way in
recent years and, in any event, it is clear that FPC jurisdiction could be expanded considerably
before any constitutional limitations would be approached.
68. Under the approach suggested by Leslie Cookenboo, L. COOKENBOO, CRUDE OIL PIPE
LINES AND COMPETITION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY (1955), the entire structure of the FPC would
be different. In essence, that approach involves the notion of regulating pipeline companies only
to the extent of requiring that all pipelines be built by joint venturers. Any person willing to
pay his share of construction costs would be allowed to become a member of the joint venture.
Since some individuals would, presumably, speculate and purchase space in order to satisfy
future demand, there would be unused space until that demand arises. Because of the existence
of the excess capacity, no monopoly profits would be available, for there would be no monopoly.
To some extent, competition between the owners of space would have the same effect when and
if the pipeline is ever operating at full capacity. The cause of the natural monopoly is eliminated,
since no one pipeline company has economies of scale not shared by its competitors, but there
is only the minimum necessary amount of regulation. Furthermore, the risk of regulatory error
is virtually non-existent, and the cost of error is shifted from the consumer, who has neither
responsibility for making the error nor the means to correct it (but who must bear the cost of
it under the present system), to the pipeline company, which has both.
The most serious difficulty with adopting the Cookenboo approach immediately is caused
by existing pipeline companies which are not joint ventures. If the regulatory scheme were
shifted immediately, it is likely that many pipeline companies would be in a monopolistic
position until such time as increased demand was sufficient to provide the incentive for an
additional pipeline.
69. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
70. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). See also Cato, Would
You Believe. . . ?, 22 NAT. REv. 505 (1970), indicating both that the FPC is still dissatisfied
with the Phillips decision and an unawareness of the history of that case. See Letters, 'TWAs
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If the recommendation that the FPC cure itself of its cost fixation
is not followed, then expansion of its jurisdiction becomes even more
essential. The allocation of costs is made immensely more difficult by
the perceived need to distinguish between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional costs. If that distinction can be eliminated, there is at
least a hope that the approach taken by the FPC will yield results
which more closely resemble a proper price structure.
BUT A DREAM, 22 NAT. REv. 596 (1970). See also Wall Street Journal at 10, col. 1, November
8, 1971 (Eastern ed.).

